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peal necessitating a transcript of the trial record.ls Defendant's motion that on
account of his indigence he be supplied with a free transcript was denied.',
The district attorney then moved to have the return served or, upon failure of
that, -o have the appeal dismissed.20 The latter motion was granted.
The Court held that seLtion 49 of the Buffalo City Court Act, inasmuch
as it requires the payment of a fee prerequisite to obtaining a transccipt for
review, is ineffectual in the case of a, indigent, and a copy of the transcript
must be provided to the defendant.
21
In New York, the right of appeal in criminal matters is guaranteed to all
defendants as protection against error.22 The federal Constitution, in both the
equal protection and the due process clauses,23 has recently been interpreted to
prohibit a state that has granted the right of appellate review from discrim-
inatory treatment of indigent defendants by failing to provide, without charge,
the papers necessary for the defendant to commence his appeal.
24
That it is a burden to provide a record of trial for appellate review has
long been recognized in New York. In the past, other devices have been used
to alleviate this situation. 2° The decision in the instant case is in accord with
sound local and national policy, in that it reaffirms the principle of equal treat-
ment for all.
Right to Counsel On Appeal
In People v. Breslin,20 decided this term, it was held that an indigent de-
fendant does not have a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel
upon an appeal after trial. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals
after the Appellate Division had affirmed his conviction for larceny, without
18. People v. Giles, 152 N.Y. 136, 46 N.E. 326 (1897).
19. The Buffalo City Court Act §49 (1909) as amended 1956 requires that
a fee of $.20 per folio of one hundred words be paid in advance to the stenog-
rapher to make a return of the evidence upon appeal.
20. N. Y. CODE CRIA. PROC. §761.
21. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§756, 757 provide generally that a return
must be made to the appellate court and this can be enforced by an order of
the court. The effect of this case is that failure of the defendant to pay a re-
quired fee will not excuse compliance with these sections of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure.
22. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §517; People v. Rirnauer, 77 Misc. 387, 136
N.Y.Supp. 833 (1912).
23. U. S. CONsT. Amend. XIV, §1.
24. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
25. Labianca v. Digianna, 137 Misc. 725, 244 N.Y.Supp. 437 (Sup.Ct. 1930).
Return of evidence not required by Supreme Court judge on appeal from City
Court of Buffalo where the reasons for the decision were fully containd in a
letter of the trial judge.
26. 4 N.Y.2d 73, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1958).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 -TERM
opinion.27 Counsel assigned for appeal to the Court of Appeals by the Court
argued that the Appellate Division had erred in refusing to assign counsel in
that court.
The cases decided up to this time in the federal courts and the courts of
other states do not require that in all instances counsel be provided an indigent
appellant in criminal matters.28 In two cases the Supreme Court of the United
States has decided that failure to provide counsel at trial in behalf of an indi-
gent is not a deprivation of constitutional rights.20 The leading Supreme Court
case holding that counsel must be provided at trial can be distinguished from
the last mentioned cases on the grounds that the offense was a capital one, the
state of Alabama required assignment of counsel, and the defendants were be-
ing tried in a place not their home for a crime repulsive to the local popu-
lace.30 From these cases it can be seen that the Supreme Court will require as-
signment of counsel at trial only when the particular facts demand that this be-
done for justice.
The Circuit Courts of Appeal have decided that counsel need not be as-
signed on the appellate level without enunciating any clear rationale for so-
holding.3' An argument a fortiori from the Supreme Court cases discussed above
may be the underlying reason.
Griffin V. Illinois32 and People v. Pride,33 a recent U. S. Supreme Court
case and a recent New York Court of Appeals case, respectively, which require
that a transcript of the trial record be supplied to an indigent defendant for
purposes of appeal, can be distinguished from the instant case on the ground
that they involve a more elementary step in appellate review than the appoifit-
ment of counsel, that is, an opportunity for an appellate tribunal to examine
the record for merit. However, as pointed out in the dissent in the instant case,
this seems to be placing a burden on the comparatively small number of ap-
pellate judges which the court refuses to place on the entire bar.
The Court was faced with a recent decision of its own holding that it was
error not to appoint counsel to an indigent, appellant under certain circum-
27. People v. Breslin, 2 A.D.2d 876, 156 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1956).
28. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1941); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1947); People v. Logan, 137 Cal.App.2d 331, 290 P.2d 11 (1955); State v. Lor-
enz, 235 Minn. 221, 50 N.W.2d 270 (1951).
29. Betts v. Brady, Bute v. Illinois, supra note 28.
30. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31. Mellott v. Underwood, 192 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied sub
nom. Mellott v. United States, 343 U.S. 967 (1952); Gorgano v. United States,
137 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1943); Lovvorn v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied 314 U.S. 607 (1941).
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
33. 3 N.Y.2d 545, 170 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1958); see next preceding casenote.
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stances. 34 In that case the defendant needed counsel assigned to examine the
record of the trial, which was inaccessible to him on account of his imprison-
ment. That case relied on the New York Constitution. The majority of the
Court 1stinguished it as another case dealing with the right of an indigent to
a free transcript of the trial proceedings.
It would seem that the decision that the Court has reached is within the
framework of existing case law, but it also seems proper to note again the un-
derlying rationale of the Griffin case: "There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."3 5
Admissibility of Confession Obtained Prior to Arraignment
In People v. Spano,36 the defendant was surrendered to the police by his
attorney pursuant to a bench warrant issued on an indictment for murder in
the first degree. He was taken into custody at 7:15 P.M. and arraigned the next
morning. Before his arraignment, however, Spano had been questioned for
several hours by the police, and contrary to the instructions of his attorney, had
made a complete confession. At the trial the confession was admitted into evi-
dence. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
On appeal the defense argued that even though the confession was volun-
tarily made it should not have been admitted into evidence because Spano's
detention by the police was illegal. The majority affirmed the conviction and
pointed out that even if the detention had been illegal (a fact not established)
the confession would be admissible since it was voluntarily given.37
The dissent agreed that the test of voluntariness is still valid but argued
that it was not controlling in the case at bar. Judge Desmond, writing for the
dissent, maintained that the confession should have been excluded since it was
extracted in the very course of judicial proceedings, and that therefore the de-
fendant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel and his privilege
against self-incrimination.
The argument based on the right against self-incrimination was disposed
of by the majority by pointing out that it is available only in cases where in-
criminating disclosures have been extorted by the constraint of legal process38
34. People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1957).
35. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1955).
36. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).
37. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §395; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
38. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
